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Abstract
This paper recasts Temin's (1976) question of whether monetary forces
caused the Great Depression in a modern time series framework. We adopt
a Bayesian estimation and forecasting algorithm to evaluate the eects of
monetary policy against nonmonetary alternatives, allowing for time-varying
parameters and coecient updating. We nd that the predictive power of
monetary policy is very small for the early phase of the depression and breaks
down almost entirely after 1931. During the propagation phase of 1930-31,
monetary policy is able to forecast correctly at short time horizons put in-
variably predicts recovery at longer horizons. Conrming Temin (1976), we
nd that nonmonetary leading indicators, particularly on residential construc-
tion and equipment investment, have impressive predictive power. Already in
September 1929, they forecast about two thirds of downturn correctly. Our
time varying framework also permits us to examine the stability of the dy-
namic parameter structure of our estimates. We nd that the monetary im-
pulse responses exhibit remarkable structural instability and react clearly to
changes in the monetary regime that occurred during the depression. We nd
this phenomenon to be discomforting in the light of the Lucas (1976) critique,
as it suggests that the money/income relationship may itself have been en-
dogenous to policy and was not in the set of deep parameters of the U.S.
economy. Given the instability and poor predictive power of monetary instru-
ments and the strong showing of leading indicators on real activity, we remain
skeptical with regard to a monetary interpretation of the Great Depression in
the U.S.
JEL classication: N12, E37, E47, C53
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1 Introduction
Since the work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), monetary orthodoxy has associated
the Great Depression with restrictive monetary policies. From mid-1928 to August
1929, the Federal Reserve responded to the stock market boom with repeated interest
rate hikes and a slowdown in monetary growth. Monetary policy continued to be
restrictive during the depression, as the Federal Reserve interpreted bank failures
such as the that of the Bank of the United States in late 1930 as the necessary
purging of an unhealthy nancial structure.
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Impulses from monetary policy did not
come to be expansionary until the New Deal, and when the swing nally occurred
it apparently came as a surprise to economic agents (Temin and Wigmore, 1990).
The monetary paradigm has come in several dierent versions, as noted by Gor-
don and Wilcox (1981). In its most extreme form, expounded e.g. by Schwartz
(1981), it states that both the initial recessionary impulse and the later deepen-
ing of the recession were caused by monetary tightening on the part of the Federal
Reserve. A less hawkish position, identied by Gordon and Wilcox (1981) to be con-
sistent with the views in Friedman and Schwartz (1963), would concede that while
other factors may have played their role in initiating the recession, monetary policy
was focal in aggravating the slump. Such an augmented version of the monetary
paradigm is also consistent with the emphasis placed on bank failures by Bernanke
(1983, 1995) and others. This research has argued for nancial rather than mone-
tary channels of transmission, emphasizing the role of information asymmetries and
participation constraints in debtor/creditor relations, as well as of debt deation as
in Fisher (1933).
To this day, the only fundamental criticism of the monetary view on the Great
Depression is by Temin (1976), who interpreted the evidence as a Keynesian demand
slump. Temin viewed a housing recession and declining consumer spending at the
end of a large boom as the fundamentals driving the economy into depression. In
more recent work, Temin (1989) attempted to reconcile this perspective with the
monetary and nancial market paradigms, endorsing the soft monetary stance that
1
See Wheelock 1991 on the doctrines of the Fed at the time.
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assigns a role for monetary policy in deepening the recession.
2
Research on price expectations during the depression has largely underscored
the monetary interpretation. According to central banking theory (see e.g. Clarida
et al. 1999), systematic monetary policy that follows pre-determined rules should
have little real eect. Contractionary monetary policy would therefore be reected
by unpleasant deationary surprises. Hamilton (1987, 1992) examined commodity
futures prices and indeed found that investors consistently underestimated price
declines during the downturn. Evans and Wachtel (1993) employed a Bayesian
methodology to infer ination expectations, only to conclude that the public's ex-
pectation of deation remained consistently below its actual speed. The only paper
we are aware of which does support the interpretation of well-anticipated ination
is by Cecchetti (1992).
In the present paper we reexamine the eectiveness of monetary policy before
and during the Great Depression, employing modern time series techniques. Also,
we evaluate monetary policy against the non-monetary alternatives suggested by
Temin (1976). We essentially tackle the issue in a twofold way. First, we concen-
trate on the information set that economic agents could possess at a given point in
time. In our statistical modeling framework we are unable to gather all the informal
and anecdotal information available to contemporary agents.
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We compensate for
this by looking into economic and nancial aggregates that we hope can map this in-
formation into the domain of quantitative analysis. If shocks to monetary policy had
a major impact on the course of events, adding the monetary policy variable to this
information set should enable us to predict output. We adhere to a strict Bayesian
updating philosophy, allowing parameters to change as new information comes in.
This methodology also enables us to overcome stationarity and small-sample prob-
lems in a smooth way. Since Perron's (1989) critique of the unit root hypothesis
and Hamilton's (1989) work on regime switches, there has been widespread skep-
2
A supply-oriented strand of research, notably Borchardt (1979), has argued from labor time
reductions and centralized wage setting in the inter-war economy to the output slump in the
depression. A similar view has recently been put forward by Prescott (1999).
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An attempt to obtain such information through reading the contemporary business press is
made by Nelson (1991).
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ticism about the correct way of modeling economic time series in the presence of
apparent structural breaks. This together with the shortness of the available time
series appears to have impeded time series work on the inter-war period. In this
context, Bayesian analysis seems particularly attractive, as it avoids imposing a spe-
cic time trend, allows for learning about stationarity and is thus exible enough to
accommodate both unit-root and trend-stationary time series (see Sims and Uhlig
1991).
In addition to forecasting the performance of the U.S. economy over time, we
are also concerned with the conditional forecasts obtained through impulse-response
functions. This now standard methodology consists in isolating the dynamic re-
sponse of any given variable to a shock to another variable in the system. As the
shocks to the dierent variables may be mutually correlated, isolating them from
each other involves a prior decision that enables the researcher to assign shocks and
variables to one another. Technically speaking, this consists in imposing identifying
restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances through a suitable
orthogonalization procedure, most commonly the Cholesky factorization, which we
employ as well.
We also adhere to a common standard as far as the specication of our estimates
and the list of variables are concerned (laid out e.g. in Bernanke and Mihov 1998,
or Uhlig 1999). Our data we take from a standard source, the NBER Macrohis-
tory database (see appendix for further details). Owing to the particularly violent
swings of the U.S. economy at the time, we place emphasis on the time-dependent
nature of our system. As Temin (1989) has noticed, the experience of the Great
Depression may itself have generated breaks in expectations, and dierent mone-
tary regimes may have prevailed. The precise theoretical nature of such regime
changes continues to present a puzzle (Sargent, 1999). Thus, we take an agnostic
approach here and allow for time dependence in all of our statistics, including the
impulse-response functions. As expectation regimes evolved over time, so may have
the dynamic eects of monetary policy. Updating the information about the U.S.
economy necessarily implies updating the information about the dynamic responses
to monetary shocks. The only \deep" parameters that we impose and keep un-
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changed concern the ordering of the variables in the Cholesky decomposition of the
variance-covariance matrix.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basics of
the model and the underlying prior assumptions. Section 3 obtains unconditional
forecasts of output from the reduced form at various critical junctures and at dif-
ferent time intervals. Section 4 discusses the evidence on the ecacy of monetary
policy from the impulse response functions. Section 5 briey turns to an analysis of
alternative nonmonetary indicators. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Model Setup
In line with the VAR methodology established by Sims (e.g. 1980) and widely used
nowadays, we study money-income causality in a reduced form that takes care of
the dynamic lead-lag relationships among the variables in the equation:
x
t
= c+
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t j
+ u
t
;u
t
 N(0;H): (1)
In this vector autoregression, x
t
is the vector of variables at time t, to be regressed
on lagged values of the same vector, where the maximum lag is of order p. The
parameter matrix A
j
(of dimension n  n) contains the coecients on the lagged
variables of lag j. H is the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances.
There is widespread agreement on the variables to be included in a reduced-
form assessment of monetary policy. Following up on Leeper et al. (1996) and
Bernanke and Mihov (1998), we include two dierent specications that account
for various channels of monetary and nancial transmission. To account for the
more traditional monetary paradigm that focused on the quantity of money, our
workhouse specication includes money, output, a general price index, a wholesale
price index as well as total and non-borrowed reserves held by banks. We also
check for a more interest-rate oriented transmission mechanism, substituting the
money aggregate with the Fed discount rate and, alternatively, short-term money
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market rates. For the monthly frequency which we use, the broadest output index
we found was a series on U.S. industrial production (interpolated quarterly series
on GNP would be in Balke and Gordon 1986). As a general price level, we take the
CPI, while for the wholesale price index, we choose a series for manufactured goods,
which excludes agricultural commodities (we do not want to attempt a monetary
explanation of the agricultural crisis of the 1920s). All data come from the NBER
macrohistory database (see the appendix for further details on data sources).
To attain maximum generality of our results, we follow the BVAR approach
of Doan et al. (1984) and allow the coecients in the A
j
's to be time depen-
dent. For each of the (transposed) rows in the concatenated parameter matrices

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, we assume the following AR(1) proces:
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is a weighting parameter and where
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a is an assumed long-term value
for a
t
. The disturbance term 
t
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the distur-
bances in the original VAR, i.e.Cov [u
t
;
t
] = 0. Together, equations (2) and the
corresponding line in the equation system (1) dene a linear dynamic system, where
equation (1) is the observation equation, (2) is the transition equation, and a
t
is the
(unobservable) state vector. In this general time-dependent formulation, the esti-
mation problem for a is converted into a conditional forecasting problem for a
tjt 1
, given the information at time t   1. Under the normality and independence as-
sumptions about the disturbances, y
tjt 1
and a
tjt 1
are jointly normally distributed
conditional on t  1, and computation of a
t
can be implemented using the Kalman
lter algorithm (Harvey, 1992; Hamilton, 1994).
Prior information or prior beliefs about the system may enter at several stages.
Among these is the standard Litterman prior, which represents the researcher's prior
belief that each time series is an AR(1) process: only the rst lags play a role, while
higher-order lags are believed to be zero. In the particular case where 
1
= 1, the
series are believed to be a random walk. Throughout, we assume the series to be
near-random walks, i.e. we set 
1
= :999 (changes in the prior made little dierence
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for the results, as promised by Uhlig 1994). To initialize the Kalman recursions,
suitable specications for H and Q have to be found. We adopt the parameter
values originally proposed by Doan et al. (1984) and reproduced in Hamilton (1994)
(see the appendix for details and further discussion).
3 Forecasting the Depression from Monetary
Shocks
If monetary shocks contributed decisively to the Great Depression in its various
stages, including the monetary instrument in a time series model of the critical
period in question should replicate the empirical evidence in satisfactory fashion.
As nonmonetary indicators appear to have consistently failed in predicting the 1929
downturn, even when VAR methods are applied (Dominguez et al., 1988; Klug and
White, 1997), we concentrate our attention on standard specications of monetary
transmission mechanisms on output as the ones discussed in the preceding section.
We adhere to a strict updating philosophy, which implies that we limit ourselves to
out-of-sample forecasts. In this section, we will focus on forecasting the behavior of
the economy in historical time at critical junctures, obtaining what has been labeled
\unconditional forecasts" (Canova, 1995). In the next section, we shall turn to an
analysis of the impulse response functions or \conditional forecasts".
Since the work of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), a common claim is that mon-
etary restrictions after 1927 caused the slide of the U.S. economy into recession.
The Fed reacted to the upcoming stock market boom by curtailing money supply
and through repeated interest rate hikes, beginning in August, 1928 (Temin, 1989).
We take an agnostic stance on whether the Fed's interest rate policies or its money
supply were more eective and simply analyze both elements separately.
To see if monetary policy contributed to the onset of the Great Depression
in quantitatively important fashion, we conduct two forecasting exercises for each
model. First, we include all information up to September 1929 and then let our
model forecast output up to late 1930. This forecast provides an idea of how the
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model's endogenous dynamics up to September, 1929, would have aected the US
economy in 1930, had no other shocks occurred. As most of the monetary restric-
tion occurred from the second half of 1928 on, we repeat our exercise. This time,
however, we stop including additional information in August, 1928, and forecast
over a two-year horizon into late 1930. This second forecasts gives us an idea of the
endogenous model dynamics in the absence of any shocks after late 1928.
[Figure 1 about here]
The results in the rst two graphs of Figure 1 show very little dierence between
the two forecasts. In neither case, a depression of any sizeable magnitude would
have occurred. The forecast from September 1929 does predict a mini recession for
early 1930, but nothing similar to the downward spiral that actually occurred. If we
start forecasting from 1927, the prole is entirely at: there is no recession, nor is
there the further upswing in output that occurred between mid-1928 and mid-1929.
Note that this observation appears to be robust to the change in the monetary
instrument or to changes in the specication. Trying to beat this result, we exper-
imented with numerous modications and specications, including a wide range of
variables from stock market data and gold ows to agricultural exports, however to
no avail. As both of our workhouse specications also include bank reserves, also
nd little evidence of indirect eects of monetary policy that would have transmitted
themselves through the banking system, as the nancial propagation hypothesis of
Bernanke (1983) would have it. Given our frustrated eorts, we have little doubt left
that the slide into the Great Depression caught U.S. monetary policy by surprise.
The initial impulse appears to have come from other than monetary sources.
During the propagation of the Great Depression, we also nd only a limited role
for monetary policy. Repeating the above exercises for late 1930, we again see that
the data predict a recovery (last graph in Figure 1). Only at very short horizons
could the model predict further declines in output correctly. In Figure 2 we plot
rolling 3 and 6 month ahead forecasts from our money and interest models, which
are being updated in monthly intervals. For the downswing of the depression, the 3
month ahead prediction of further decline appears to work well. Note that for the
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second phase of the depression from late 1931 on, there is a lot of new turbulence; the
short term forecasts generally perform much worse than they do in the downturn.
In contrast, the condence bands for the 6 month prediction are already performing
poorly during the downturn, indicating a recovery that was not to come. An analyst
looking into the data would have concluded most of the time that an upswing was
just around the corner
4
.
[Figure 2 about here]
This seems consistent with the well-established observation that academic ex-
perts, advisors, and the Federal Reserve itself had it all wrong during the depression
(Dominguez et al., 1988; Wheelock, 1991). We may criticize them for having done
such a bad job. But looking at monetary policy alone, we cannot do much better,
however hard we try.
4 The Quantitative Impact of Monetary Policy
We now turn to the quantitative eects of monetary policy on the U.S. economy
before and during the Great Depression. Although monetary shocks appear to
perform poorly in explaining the major turning points of the depression, it would be
mistaken to conclude that money had no eects at all. To examine this question, we
explore the dynamic multiplier eects of innovations to monetary policy, which are
propagated through equation (1) by the coecient matrices A
j
. As is standard in
the VAR methodology, we obtain orthogonalized residuals and the impulse response
functions from a Cholesky decomposition of H, the variance-covariance matrix of
the disturbances on the observation equation. The ordering of the variables is the
usual one, proceeding from the exogenous monetary instrument (money or the Fed
rate) to total and nonborrowed reserves, wholesale and general price indices and,
nally, output.
4
We note in passing that this was another conjecture of Temin (1976, p. 76). See Mayer (1978)
for a criticism of Temin (1976) and an evaluation of the importance of this - then missing - piece
of evidence.
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A common procedure would be to treat the whole observation period from 1922
to 1935 as one monetary regime and accordingly obtain impulse responses using
information from the whole span. However, we bear in mind Temin's (1989) warn-
ings about changes in expectational regimes: if agents' perceptions of the eects of
monetary policy changed rapidly between 1929 and 1933, imposing a time-invariant
impulse-response pattern would essentially be a violation of the Lucas (1976) cri-
tique. A possible answer to this problem based on classical statistics could be to
account for these regime changes through deterministic trend components, as sug-
gested by Perron (1989), or through Markov switching models in the spirit of Hamil-
ton (1989). This would imply xing structural breaks and switchpoints exogenously,
assuming that between any two switches the deep parameters of the system remain
unchanged. The recursive methodology which we follow here provides a natural
way of nding structural shifts endogenously, as it fully embraces time-dependency
and GARCH eects on parameters. Changing parameter structures over time also
translate into time dependency of the impulse response functions: as time goes on
and new observations are added to the information set, the information pertaining
to the conditional forecasts changes as well. We implement this by updating the
impulse-response functions at our observation frequency, i.e. every month. As the
Kalman recursions take time to converge from their initial conditions, we will al-
ways disregard the evidence for the rst three or four years and start interpreting
the results only from 1927 on.
Figure 3 graphs the evolution of the time-dependent impulse responses to orthog-
onal one-standard deviation innovations in money, dened as M1 and employing the
data of .
5
To keep the graph readable, we plot the impulse responses only at selected
xed intervals (3, 6, and 12 months).
[Figure 3 about here]
We rst look into the response of money to its own shock. As can be seen, the
5
We employ a broader concept of money consistent with M1 in Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
Attempts to employ high-powered money instead resulted in impulse responses which all had
wrong signs. To make sure, we cross-checked this result with the standard RATS software package,
however without obtaining any qualitative changes. We have no economic explanation to oer for
this phenomenon.
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1929 crash induces a structural break; money is apparently endogenous, at least to
some extent. Turning to the impulse responses of wholesale and consumer prices,
we nd that during the two years preceding the depression, their responses have
opposite signs. This is one version of the so-called price puzzle rst described by
Sims (1992). Prices initially tend to move in the wrong direction in reaction to a
monetary shock. Note also that the output response to money, shown in the last
chart of Figure 3, is positive and remarkably stable prior to the slump.
The advent of the depression aected the dynamic parameter structure in very
marked fashion. The two price series now react strongly positively to quantity of
money impulses, i.e. money and prices fall together. The same is true of output,
which becomes more sensitive to money impulses as the depression deepens. If we
had obtained the same result with high-powered money in the place of M1, we would
be tempted to argue that evidence supports the account e.g. in Temin (1989) of an
increased importance of monetary policy during the spread of the Great Depression.
However, the fact that we could not replicate these results with high-powered money
induces us to be cautious about such an interpretation. More research is still needed
to determine whether the seeming increase in the impact of money impulses during
the second phase of the depression is not an artifact generated by the endogenous
components of money demand.
To account for a more demand-oriented perspective on monetary policy, as pro-
posed e.g. in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), we again adopted an alternative speci-
cation in which money is replaced by the federal discount rate.
6
Results are plotted
in Figure 4. Again, we refrain from interpreting the evidence before, say, 1926, where
results may still be dominated by the Kalman lter algorithm's initial convergence.
Later on, the responses again exhibit the price puzzle: the initial response in prices
to a discount rate hike is positive. During the depression period, this puzzle even
seems to become worse, as prices now move in the same direction as the fed discount
rate even at 12-month lags. Interest rate policy was clearly ineective in stabilizing
prices; if anything it was counter-productive.
6
The modied system then has the ordering (ascending in the order of endogeneity): federal
discount rate, non-borrowed reserves, total reserves, commodity prices, CPI, output.
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[Figure 4 about here]
Up until late 1931, interest rate policy does seem to have had the desired eects
on reserves, contracting them during the stock market boom and expanding them
during the recession. Note, however, the blips in either graph after the stock market
crash of 1929. Apparently, the interest rate reductions of late 1929 and early 1930
failed to have an immediate eect on banks' behavior, contrary to previous experi-
ence. The converse is true for the interest rate hikes of late 1928, which apparently
had a stronger than normal eect on non-borrowed reserves but failed to inuence
total reserves. We also note that during the stock market boom, the output response
to innovations in the interest rate is falling steadily: at the time the stock market
collapsed, interest rate policy was less ecient than ever since 1926 in inuencing
output. Only during 1930 do we see a correction; contrary to much folk wisdom, the
interest rate cuts of that year did have a positive eect on output and were more
eective than the increases in the two preceding years.
The salient feature of Figure 4 is again the structural shift that occurs in late
1931, when the Fed raised its discount rates several times in response to the Euro-
pean banking crises and Britain's departure from the gold standard. None of the
impulse-response functions in the graph remains invariant to this regime change,
and their subsequent behavior looks irregular. Clearly, conducting monetary policy
in the chaotic conditions that prevailed after 1931 would have been a dicult task
for anyone. This second phase of the depression, as Temin (1989) has termed it,
exhibits all kinds of puzzles in the nominal variables concerned, while the real eects
of interest policy on output seem to be erratic and on the decline.
In sum, the evidence on the Fed's discount policy seems to suggest that before
the onset of the depression and in its initial phase, its eects remain within the
normal bounds, being far too small to explain the collapse in output after 1929.
Interest rate changes alone would probably have generated a mild recession in 1930
and an equally mild upswing thereafter. Furthermore, given the price puzzles in
our results, the interest rate hikes before the stock market crash can only hardly be
held responsible for the later deationary collapse. Our data clearly show a second
phase of the recession after late 1931. However, this period is marked by extreme
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lack of stability of the underlying dynamic structure. As the previous regularities
faded away, no stable relation between interest rates, prices, and output was left
that could have been exploited for economic policy.
5 \Real" Alternatives: Forecasting the Depres-
sion from Leading Indicators of Real Business
Activity
Of course, we are slightly less agnostic about forecasting the depression than the
previous sections suggested. In this section, we present an alternative based on
leading indicators of investment activity. Temin (1976) had suggested that a sharp
decline in residential construction led way into depression. We take this evidence on
board by looking at residential building permits, another time series we found in the
NBER macrohistory database. We combine this series with classical leading indica-
tors of equipment investment, such as steel production and shipments of machinery,
to predict manufacturing output. The system we specied thus includes manufac-
turing output, building permits, production of steel sheets, steel ingots, machine
shipments, and prices of metal products. As before in Section 3, we are interested in
the performance of output forecasts before the stock market crash of October, 1929.
We also leave the principal methodology unchanged, i.e. we infer the unconditional
forecasts in historical time from a Bayesian VAR with time dependent coecients
and a Litterman prior. Results, shown in Figure 5, are clear-cut: a 36 month forecast
produced with the information set of September, 1929, already predicts almost half
of the decline that later actually occurred. As soon as we disregard money and the
nancial sector and concentrate on real indicators alone, the depression is already
clearly in the data prior to the stock market crash.
[Figure 5 about here]
We also experimented with combining these series with nancial and monetary
information in our VARs, however with a striking result: as soon as we included
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nancial variables in the equation, its predictive power decreased sharply. If there
was information in the U.S. economy in 1929 about an imminent slump, it was in
real activity. Each of the nancial monetary variables we included turned out to
obscure the facts. We also attempted reducing system size to just three or four
series. The main results of 5 still hold if we include only building permits and
machine shipments to explain output
7
.
In order to see at which point the real economy started to show signs of a major
downturn, we let the system stop in March and in June 1929. The lower panel in 5
shows the results of this exercise. Already in March 1929, the real data reveal signs
of a major recession in the U.S. economy, almost half a year before the stock market
collapsed.
Of course, this is consistent with conventional wisdom on the Great Depression.
The fact that a turning point in real activity occurred in mid-1929 is mentioned in
almost any major classroom text in economic history (we refer the reader to, e.g.,
Walton and Rocko 1998). What is new and needs to be emphasized, though, is
that the downturn in real activity was apparently more than just the onset of a
normal recession,as Temin (1989) presumed it. Real data predict a severe decline in
economic activity already in 1929, which means that most probably, no additional
hypotheses are needed to explain why a normal recession turned into a depression.
6 Conclusion
This paper has undertaken a Bayesian VAR analysis for U.S. data to examine the
question whether monetary forces caused the Great Depression. Our results conrm
the skepticism that has been expressed in much of the literature since Temin (1976)
raised this question. We nd no evidence that monetary restriction prior to the stock
market crash of 1929 produced anything beyond a very mild recession. During the
subsequent spread of the depression, interest rate policy had positive output eects,
7
We still prefer the system shown in Figure 5, as it exhibits stationary eigenvalues: the forecast
reverts to the mean if only sucient time is allowed. Smaller systems had a tendency to yield
nonstationary eigenvalues, which means their forecasts would essentially predict a plane crash.
13
while the contemporaneous decline in money circulation aected output adversely.
In the second phase of the depression from late 1931 onwards, the underlying struc-
tures become unstable, and the eects of monetary policy appear to more erratic
and puzzling.
The most visible feature of our results on monetary forces is their poor fore-
casting ability. If the Great Depression was largely driven by monetary surprises,
incorporating the monetary instruments in a time series model should improve its
predictive power. Except for very short time horizons, we do not obtain this. During
the downturn of 1930/1, agents attempting to forecast at six month intervals from
money instruments in a VAR would consistently overpredict output. We nd this
evidence to be dicult to reconcile with the concept of monetary surprise shocks.
This does not mean that the Great Depression was impossible to predict. We
found very robust evidence that a major downturn was visible in U.S. data already
in mid-1929, turning to leading indicators of business activity. Evaluating Temin's
(1976) hypothesis that the depression was led by a major slump in residential con-
struction, we combined data on residential building permits and a number of leading
indicators on equipment investment with output. We found that these data predict
a sharp and lasting decline in U.S. manufacturing production already from May
1929, on. Forecasting power was substantially reduced every time we attempted to
include nancial and monetary series in the equations.
On a more fundamental level, we were concerned in this paper with the stability
of the parameter structures underlying monetary and nancial transmission chan-
nels. To accommodate these shifts, we employed a Bayesian updating methodology
that allows for time-dependent parameters and a exible treatment of the stationar-
ity problem in the underlying time series. We also extended the updating philosophy
to our analysis of the impulse response functions, nding them to become highly
unstable as the depression moved into its second phase.
In the light of the Lucas (1976) critique, we consider the instability of the pa-
rameters underlying the impulse responses of monetary policy during the Great
Depression to be particularly discomforting. If these relationships were in the set
of deep parameters of the U.S. economy, they should themselves be time invariant
14
and not be endogenous to changes in the monetary regime. Given this instability
and the clearly superior forecasting performance of real indicators, we are deeply
skeptical about a standard monetary interpretation of the Great Depression.
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Appendix
We assume an n dimensional VAR of order p = 12:
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We need a to be time dependent, and end up with the following measurement
equation:
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We assume that the variance of u
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is given by
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are from an OLS estimation of equation j. The transition equation
system is given by
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We assume that the initial prior distribution for a
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For the following, see Doan et al. (1984), Doan et al. (1986), and Hamilton (1994, p.401-403).
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Figure 1: Forecasting the Great Depression, Interest Rate Model
The dashed lines are 95 per cent condence intervals.
Figure 2: Forecasting the Great Depression, 3 and 6 Months Rolling Forecasts
The dashed lines are 95 per cent condence intervals, the solid line is the original series.
Figure 3: Response to Money Shock (1)
The solid line is the response after 3 months, the dashed line after 6 months, and the
dotted line after 12 months.
Figure 3 (continued): Response to Money Shock (2)
The solid line is the response after 3 months, the dashed line after 6 months, and the
dotted line after 12 months.
Figure 4: Response to Discount Rate Shock (1)
The solid line is the response after 3 months, the dashed line after 6 months, and the
dotted line after 12 months.
Figure 4 (continued): Response to Discount Rate Shock (2)
The solid line is the response after 3 months, the dashed line after 6 months, and the
dotted line after 12 months.
Figure 5: Forecasting the Great Depression, Leading Indicators
The dashed lines in the upper graphic are 95 per cent condence intervals. The lower
graphic contains forecasts starting in March and June 1929.
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